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Introduction
Protracted, large-scale military conflict has been all too common in the post-communist world, affecting 8 of the 28 successor states. It has long been observed that 'new' states are more subject to internal and international military conflict (Wright, 1942) . However, the causes of such conflicts have been more thoroughly studied than their consequences. * Data used in this article can be downloaded at http: //www.uwm.edu/Dept/Polsci/faculty/horowitz.html. Statistical results were generated using EViews 2.0. Inquiries can be sent to the author at shale@uwm.edu.
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to dismantling planned or socialized economies and instituting market-based ownership and resource allocation mechanisms. Hence, those seeking to preserve many elements of the old economic regime should be more opposed to democracy, and those in favor of a rapid transition to a market economy more supportive of democracy.
The industries that were most heavily subsidized under the old economic regime would be expected to lose most from market transition. The most heavily subsidized industries were capital-intensive manufacturing sectors and agriculture. Moreover, capital-intensive manufacturing sectors were least likely to be viable under market conditions in less developed post-communist countries. In contrast, the biggest beneficiaries of market reform were urban service sector workers, especially those living in the more diversified economies of the big cities. More developed economies had smaller agricultural sectors, more viable capital-intensive manufacturing sectors, and larger urban service sectors (World Bank, 1996) . HI: More economically developed postcommunist countries should be more strongly supportive of democratization, as a means of pursuing market reform. Less developed post-communist countries should be more supportive of authoritarian alternatives, as a means of propping up the old economic regime.
Consider now differences in political culture. Nationalist popular front movements were a commonly observed mechanism of dislodging communist regimes and replacing them with democracies. Such movements can be interpreted largely as expressions of frustration with the contrast between Soviet-or Yugoslav-imposed political and economic regimes, and expectations based on pre-communist political and economic achievements (Horowitz & Marsh, 2002; Powers & Cox, 1997) . Countries with more 'golden' pre-communist political or economic pasts should be more anxious to break with the communist system. Here, democracy would not only be an end in itself, but would also be the most credible means of pursuing other goals -such as cultural freedoms and market reforms. This influence should be operative on the elite as well as the mass levels. Countries with stronger frustrated national ideals should have more reformist communist parties, as well as larger, better organized, and more ideologically committed anti-establishment leaderships.
Two points of clarification are necessary here. First, such frustrated national ideals represent collective rather than individual goods, and hence are not the same as favoring reform for individual reasons (such as individual economic interests or individual freedom of expression). Second, institutions like democracy and liberalized markets are not always the most plausible means of pursuing collective goals. They were commonly the most plausible candidates in the postcommunist cases for two reasons. To begin with, the old regime was politically authoritarian and economically interventionist, so a sharply contrasting model would be expected to be more appealing to those with stronger frustrated national ideals. Added to this was the contemporary attractiveness and international political, economic, and cultural openness of liberal democracies -most importantly those in Western Europe and North America.1 H2: Post-communist elites and masses with stronger frustrated national idealsstronger expectations of collective political and economic attainment based on greater pre-communist political and economic achievementsshould be more likely to dismantle the 28 journal of PEACE RESEARCH old authoritarian regime, embrace democracy, and pursue more aggressive market reforms.
Once democracy is instituted, some types of political institutions may be less likely to facilitate its survival and full development. In the post-communist context, they may also be less likely to facilitate more thorough and sustained market reforms. Strong presidencies may represent more of a coup threat to young democracies. Such democracies often have more significant unsettled political conflicts. Under such circumstances, political elites are more likely to be highly disaffected. Here strong executives are better situated to seize power and impose their preferred policies by authoritarian means (Linz & Valenzuela, 1994).
H3: Following democratic transitions, post-
communist countries with stronger presidencies are less likely to remain democracies, and less likely to implement more completely democratic rules of the game and more thorough market reforms.
It can also be argued that democracies with more fragmented party systems are less likely to last. Such fragmented party systems may be more subject to penetration by special interest groups opposing popular policy changes (Haggard & Kaufman, 1992;  cf. Hellman, 1998). If this is so, democratic reformers may be more readily discredited and replaced by authoritarian alternatives. Such alternatives might champion a return to the old regime, or offer vaguer populist programs. They may come to power through the ballot box, or through coups. Democratic institutions and freedoms and market reforms are more likely to be eroded or destroyed.
H4: Following democratic transitions, postcommunist countries with more fragmented party systems are less likely to remain democracies, and less likely to implement more completely democratic rules of the game and more thorough market reforms.
Eight of the 28 post-communist countries had their transitions interrupted by protracted, large-scale war. The direct human and economic costs of large-scale war are well known. But violent conflict would also be expected to negatively affect democratization and market reform through three distinct political mechanisms: political distraction, military defeat and disruption, and economic isolation (Masih & Krikorian, 1999; Slider, 1997; Thomas, 1999) .
Wars should tend to distract reformist movements and governments from the tasks of market reform and democratization. Priorities are likely to shift to dealing with the immediate military emergency. Economic reforms will tend to be delayed or deformed, at least for the duration of military hostilities. Reforms of the state administration, armed forces and legal system will be similarly delayed or deformed. Even democratically oriented governments tend to develop siege mentalities, accumulate extraordinary legal powers, and become less tolerant of political opposition and media criticism. Along with the direct costs and destruction associated with war, such distraction tends to undermine economic performance and civil and political freedoms, and hence to discredit reformist policy agendas and governments.
On the other hand, such economic and political conditions might be expected to provide cover for the controversial and damaging policy regimes and authoritarian political methods often embraced by conservative communist-era elites. Frustrated National Ideals This index is designed to predict the extent to which the communist era is viewed as a serious setback to national development, and thus to predict the extent to which the most plausible alternative systems will be embraced as a means of achieving a political, economic, and cultural renaissance of the nation. The index averages rankings of pre-communist political and economic achievement. Past political and economic achievements are ranked on a scale of one to five, with five indicating highest achievement. Classifications of countries are given in Table I .
The idea behind the first, economic ranking is that countries with greater precommunist economic achievements will look much more unfavorably on the consequences of planned or socialized economic regimes. The best available quantitative index of development is the share of the workforce employed in agriculture. In the former Soviet Union, it is the titular ethnic group's share that is used in the ranking. This was often markedly higher than the total share, due to predominance of ethnic Russians in the big cities. Table II shows results for the full sample of post-communist countries, both democratic and non-democratic. The frustrated national ideals index has the most explanatory power and is most statistically significant. The share Table III shows results for the subgroup of post-communist countries with democratic political institutions. For this reduced group, it is possible to introduce variation in the forms of democratic political institutionshere strength of presidency and party system concentration. Again, the two most powerful and significant variables are frustrated national ideals and share of time at war. Within this more democratic subgroup, share of time at war has similar statistical significance and greater explanatory power as compared to frustrated national ideals. The structural economic variable (agricultural employment share) and the presidency and party system variables are uniformly not significant. Moreover, a stronger presidency is estimated to have a weakly favorable effect on democratization, rather than the predicted unfavorable effect. The estimated directional impacts of agricultural employment share and party system concentration are not consistent over the three periods.8 Trimmed models -labeled in the tables with a 'T' ending -show that, when the structural 8 If the time-weighted average of the party system concentration indices is used, there is no significant change in the results. This is also true for the results of Table IV shows models of market reform using the same sets of independent variables. Again, because of missing data during wartime years, measures of market reform for all the countries at war are not available until the latest time-interval. Therefore, the models should be viewed as testing the longer-term impact of the variables. The results are broadly consistent with the models of democratization. Share of time at war and frustrated national ideals are most powerful and significant. Share of time at war is relatively more powerful in its effect on the subgroup of more democratic countries, in models 8 and 8T. The institutional variables again do not have a statistically significant impact.
Results
It has often been argued that regime type affects the likelihood of war. Most have argued that democracy contributes to peace. But some have also argued that new democracies, such as those of the post-communist world, are more prone to war (Snyder, 2000) . To the extent such reciprocal effects of regime type on war exist, the above estimates of how war affects democratization would be biased (Gates, Knutsen & Moses, 1996) . For two reasons, this does not appear to be a significant source of bias for the estimates above. First, the effect of regime type on the likelihood of war is weak and complex. Six of eight countries that went to war had some claim to operating democratic institutions, and 22 of 27 post-communist countries had some claim to operating democratic institutions in the prewar period. Democracy sometimes unleashed ethnically or regionally based disputes over territorial sovereignty and autonomy. But in these cases, democracy was an enabling variable that would not be expected to contribute to war under other circumstances. Moreover, the cases of 35 journal of PEACE RESEARCH Croatia's westward and coastal geographical location meant that Croatia's enemies could not impose economic isolation. Given the initially strong support for democratization and market reform, this meant that the main threat resulting from the war was militarization, internal division or collapse of the state. However, CDU elites retained longterm commitments to democracy and had consolidated central military authority by late 1991. CDU leader Franjo Tudjman was willing to harass the mass media and even the political opposition in order to win the war, preserve Croatia's territorial integrity, and establish a de facto protectorate over the Bosnian Croats. There was a danger that these measures might trigger a transition to a long-term authoritarian regime. Thomas, 1999 The widely discussed political developments in Milosevic's Serbia were exceptional rather than typical. Only in Serbia did the incumbent communist party (Serbian LC) survive by outflanking most of the opposition on the nationalist right, and then by actively promoting military conflict. As long as Milosevic continued to show some minimal respect for democratic rules, this was a risky strategy -as Milosevic finally had occasion to discover. Most other incumbent authoritarian leaderships preoccupied with keeping power understood the need to avoid war, or to disengage from it as soon as possible, in order to consolidate power against internal opposition.
Democratic nationalist governments typically did not want war. But self-imposed ideological constraints and electoral constraints often made it difficult to make the political concessions necessary to avoid war, or to disengage quickly from war. War forced such governments to sideline their political and economic reform agendas, and to conduct militarily and politically dangerous war efforts. In Croatia, promising initial cultural-political and economic conditions minimized the long-term dangers to the reform agenda. In Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the resulting long-term threats to political and economic reform were much more grave.
In Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is almost miraculous that democracy survived at all, albeit in a badly weakened condition. Moldova avoided greater initial disruption by making dramatic concessions and thus avoiding protracted conflict. This was possible because almost everyone understood the futility of fighting ethnic Russian rebels supported by regular Russian forces. Still, long-term economic disruption continues to pose a significant threat. Despite Armenia's isolation and terrible economic privations, the initially strong political consensus in favor of democracy and market reform has proven resilient in the face of considerable political and military turbulence.
In general, the most important initial condition seems to be the ideological strength of the reform nationalist agenda among both elites and masses. Apart from distraction for the duration of the conflict, the two more chronic threats to revival of any initial reform agenda have been militarization or military disruption of the state, and postwar economic isolation.
Conclusions
Across the post-communist world, war appears to have had a dramatic negative impact on democratization and market reform. This impact appears greater in initially democratic post-communist countries. This result holds particular interest in the light of the apparently dominant role played by political culture -frustrated national ideals -among the various initial conditions. While association with national revival was crucial in instituting and sustaining political and economic reform, such ideological justifications were often provocative to internal minorities and neighboring states. Nor were such ideological principles easily compromised to avoid internal and international conflict. In other words, many postcommunist countries were caught in a tragic political trap, in which the ideological glue necessary to mobilize for political and economic reforms tended to produce conflicts, which in turn rendered reforms far more difficult to sustain. This did not just occur where leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic used such ideologies in blatantly instrumental efforts to compete for power. It occurred much more broadly, even where new governments intended to abide by democratic rules, and would have much preferred to avoid war.
Such political circumstances may not be unique to the post-communist world. Looking back at past waves of political and economic One main strand of the democratic peace literature argues that individual level cost-benefit analyses feed through democratic institutions to avoid war. The discussion above supports those calling for richer microfoundations. These must account for how individual cost-benefit analyses might aggregate to yield democratic war as well as democratic peace (Gates, Knutsen & Moses, 1996; Snyder, 2000) . In the post-communist countries, the most common democratic war scenario arises from ethnically based disputes over territorial sovereignty or autonomy. The next step is to build a theory of how authoritarian regimes are likely to react to similar situations. Tests of the democratic peace hypothesis are likely to be more persuasive when the effects of regime type are tested under theoretically comparable conditions.
